We derive new bounds for the price of anarchy under nonlinear and asymmetric costs. The bounds depend on an additional factor called the intrinsic cost of the system and therefore tend to be more accurate than the current bounds that are dependent only on the degree of asymmetry of the Jacobian and the degree of the nonlinearity of the cost function.
Introduction
Many problems in business operations can be modeled as Nash games. It is well known that the solutions of a Nash game, i.e. the Nash equilibria may not be efficient from the system point of view. The inefficiency of Nash equilibrium has been extensively studied in recent literature [3, 4, 11, 16] . The phrase "the price of anarchy" is used by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [13] to characterize the degree of efficiency loss, which is the ratio of the system's cost at a Nash equilibrium point and the overall optimal cost of the system optimization problem. Various worst case bounds of the price of anarchy have been established for the system optimization problems in which a Nash equilibrium point exists. Notable examples include the network equilibrium problem, e.g., [2, 8, 16] , the competitive multi-period pricing problem, e.g., [15] , and the Nash Cournot equilibria problem, e.g., [7] .
Perakis [14] emphasized the importance of non-separable and asymmetric system cost in the study of the price of anarchy and established bounds for linear and nonlinear nonseparable cost functions, which depend on the degree of asymmetry and nonlinearity of the cost function. She also gave some examples to show that the bounds could be tight. The model under consideration is as follows. Let the system optimization problem be min x F (x) subject to x ∈ K ⊂ R n ,
where F : R n → R n is a continuously differentiable function and K is a nonempty, closed, convex and bounded subset of R n . Suppose that the Nash equilibrium points of the system are characterized by the solution set of a variational inequality problem called the user optimization problem
Let x u and x s denote solutions of the user and system optimization problems, respectively. Let Z u = x u F (x u ) be the cost of the user-optimized problem and
the cost of the system optimization problem, respectively. The target is to provide bounds for Z u /Z s .
In this paper, we generalize the results of Perakis [14] . We show that the bounds depend on not only the degree of asymmetry and the nonlinearity of the cost function, but also an intrinsic property of the system, namely, the ratio between the minimum intrinsic cost and the maximum intrinsic cost (defined later). The new bounds are not trivial in the sense that they are generally more accurate than the old bounds and that if the above ratio reduces to zero, then the new and old bounds become identical.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we prove our new bounds. In Section 3, we give some examples to show that the new bounds can improve the current bounds. The new bounds allow us to draw some interesting insights, which cannot be observed using the bounds in [14] . Finally, we make some concluding remarks in Section 4.
New bounds 2.1 The linear case
We first consider the case that the cost function F is linear. That is, F (x) = M x + q, where M is an n × n, positive definite and possibly asymmetric matrix, and q x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ K.
In a similar way to [14] , we characterize the degree of asymmetry of a matrix M using the following constant.
where
is invertible and · S denotes the S-norm of a vector, i.e. x S := √ x Sx.
The constant c 2 was originally introduced by Hammond [9] and has the following property:
The following theorem provides a new bound of the price of anarchy for the linear case.
Theorem 2.1 Suppose that F (x) = M x + q, M is positive definite and q x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ K. Let x u be a solution of the user optimization problem (2) and let x s be a solution of the system optimization problem (1) . Then
otherwise,
Proof. Since x u is a solution of the variational inequality problem (2) and x s ∈ K, we have
Thus,
For any two vectors x and y in R n , we have
where a 1 , a 2 ≥ 0, and a 1 a 2 ≥ c 2 4 . We consider the two cases, c 2 ≥ 4 and c 2 < 4, separately.
For the first case, we can further select a 2 ≥ 1 and a 1 < 1 so that the last two terms in (5) are nonpositive, resulting in
Thus, we can find a good upper bound by solving minimize
The solution is a 1 = 1/2, a 2 = c 2 /2 and Z u /Z s ≤ c 2 , which is the same bound as that in [14] .
We now discuss the second case. Let us define the maximum and minimum intrinsic costs respectively by C sup := sup x∈K q x and C inf := inf x∈K q x and impose the condition that 0 ≤ a 1 < 1,
we have
In a similar way to the first case, we can find an upper bound by solving minimize
The solution is a 1 = 1/2, a 2 = c 2 /2 and Z u /Z s ≤ c 2 . Otherwise, if c 2 d < 1 and
and
Remark: In the above theorem, we have used the convention that 0 0 = 1; that is, when q = 0, we have d = 1. For sup x∈K q x = ∞, we have d = 0 and
It then follows immediately that when d = 0, our bound reduces to
which is the one obtained by Perakis [14] .
For the separable affine functions where the matrix M is diagonal positive definite or nonseparable functions where M is symmetric positive definite, c 2 = 1. Roughgaden and Tardos [16] and Perakis [14] derive the bound 4/3 for the separable and nonseparable case, respectively. They showed that the bound can be tight. We can see that our bound can also be tight, since it is a generalization of that of Perakis. Furthermore, our new bounds can give some useful information on the problem, using the quantity d. For example, when d = 1, that is, if the intrinsic cost is a constant, then the bound is c 2 and we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1 If the intrinsic cost q x is a constant for all x ∈ K and if M is a positive definite matrix, then
Remark: The above corollary includes Corollary 2 in [14] as a special case, where the same bound was derived for the case that q = 0. Furthermore, if c 2 = 1, i.e., for the separable case or the nonseparable symmetric case, the bound is 1. Hence, we have provided a sufficient condition where there is no efficiency loss in the game.
The nonlinear case
In this section, we show that the results in the previous subsection can be extended to the case of nonlinear and asymmetric cost functions. Here, the Jacobian matrix is not a constant matrix M but a positive definite and asymmetric matrix ∇F (x). The positive-definiteness of the Jacobian ∇F (x) and the boundedness of K ensure that the variational inequality problem (2) has a unique solution [6] .
To derive the bounds, we have to introduce two quantities for measuring the degree of asymmetry and the nonlinearity, respectively. The following definition is from Definition 2 of [14] .
Definition 2.2 The quantity c
2 for the nonlinear function F , which measures the asymmetry of the Jacobian ∇F (x), is defined as
where S(x) = ∇F (x) + ∇F (x) 2 is the symmetrized part of the Jacobian matrix ∇F (x).
The following definition was first used in [12] and [17] in the analysis of interior point methods. It finds new applications recently in the analysis of the price of anarchy [14] .
Definition 2.3
The function F : R n → R n is said to satisfy the Jacobian similarity condition if there exists κ ≥ 1 such that ∀w ∈ R n , ∀x,x ∈ K, there holds
Theorem 2.2 Suppose that F (x) satisfies the Jacobian similarity condition and that
Proof. Since x u is a solution of the variational inequality problem (2) and x s ∈ K, using a similar argument as for the linear case, we have
Then from the mean value theorem we have that there is somet ∈ [0, 1] such that
where the second inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, the third one from the norm inequality, the fourth one from (9) , and the last one from (4) and a 1 a 2 ≥ c 2 4 . Applying again the mean value theorem to the functions
we claim that there are t 1 , t 2 ∈ [0, 1], such that
We consider the two cases c 2 ≥ 4 or c 2 κ > 2 and c 2 < 4, c 2 κ < 2 separately.
Case 1: c 2 ≥ 4 or c 2 κ > 2. For this case, we can further select that a 2 ≥ 1 and a 1 < 1.
The analysis is the same as that in [14] and we include it here just for completeness. It follows from (10)- (12) that
where the inequality follows from the Jacobian similarity. Using the assumption that F (0) x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ K, we obtain from the above inequality that
Thus, we can obtain an upper bound by solving
The solution is a 1 = 1 2κ , a 2 = c 2 κ/2, and
Case 2: c 2 < 4 and c 2 κ < 2. For this case, we further impose the condition that a 2 ≤ 1. It follows from (10)- (12), the fact that a 2 ≤ 1 and the Jacobian similarity that
Therefore, we can find an upper bound by solving
Otherwise, if c 2 κ 2 d ≤ 1 and
< κ −1 , we have the solution that
, a 2 = c 2 κ/2, and
Remarks: Theorem 2.2 is a direct extension of Theorem 2.1. Note that if the cost function is linear, i.e., F (x) = M x + q, then κ = 1. In this case, the bounds in Theorem 2.2 reduce exactly to those in Theorem 2.1. If sup x∈K F (0) x = ∞ then d = 0 and the bound reduces to that of [14] for the nonlinear case.
Examples in traffic equilibrium
From the above section, we can see that for the case that c 2 > 4, the bounds presented here are the same as those derived in [14] . The difference arises in the case when c 2 ≤ 4. In this case, instead of the constraint that a 2 ≥ 1, we use
for the linear case and
for the nonlinear case, in the optimization problem to derive the bound. The feasible region in these optimization problems can be larger than that in [14] and thus the bounds cannot be worse than those in [14] . Figure 1 shows the situation, where c 2 = 1.3, C sup = 2 and C inf = 0.8.
Our work adds another dimension to the problem discussed by Perakis, incorporating the effects from d (the intrinsic cost) and c (degree of asymmetry of matrix M ). We present some insights using some simple examples. From the two figures we can see that the new bound is not worse than that of [14] and in some cases, it can be better. In Figure 2 , at d = 0 (by convention, we have infinite max intrinsic cost), the two bounds are the same. However, as the max intrinsic cost increases, the bound gets better. An explanation to this phenomenon is that lowering the max intrinsic cost will imply that the max cost of the inefficiency of the user is not heavily penalized. Thus the user tends to make near-sighted decisions, which results in a smaller value for the ratio Z u /Z s . We are able to capture this characteristic from our analysis. The feasible region of the optimization problem in [14] is the intersection of 0 ≤ a 1 < 1, a 2 ≥ 1, and a 1 a 2 ≥ c 2 /4; while our feasible region is the intersection of 0 ≤ a 1 < 1, 0.8a 1 + a 2 ≥ 1, and a 1 a 2 ≥ c 2 /4. It is clear that our region is larger than that of [14] , as shown by the shadowed part. suggests that having a low degree of asymmetry leads to a low ratio of Z u /Z s . This can be verified by both bounds. However, it is clear that our bound is more sensitive than the old bound when c is small (c < 1.4).
We now present some examples to illustrate our results. Using the following formula [14] 
, where S = (M + M )/2, we can calculate that c 2 = 1.2581. The feasible set K is
The minimum intrinsic cost is inf x∈K q x = 60 and the maximum intrinsic cost is sup x∈K q x = 300. Consequently, d = 0.2. The bound from [14] is 4 (4 − c 2 ) = 1.4588, and our new bound from Theorem 2.1 is
better than 1.4588. 
Concluding remarks
We have derived new bounds for efficiency loss in a model where the Nash equilibrium can be characterized by a variational inequality and the system objective function is of the form x F (x). We focus on deriving an upper bound for the ratio Z u /Z s . We introduced a ratio d, which is the ratio between the minimum and the maximum intrinsic costs. We extended the results of Perakis and show that the bound for Z u /Z s depends on d. When d reduces to one, which corresponds to the linear and symmetric systems, there is no loss of efficiency. Our numerical results suggest that the ratio d plays an important role in determining the ratio Z s /Z u . We provide some insights regarding the intrinsic cost, which appears to be new to the literature. A potential application of this notion could be in the design of strategies for improving the user's solution; e.g., setting the toll price in a congested traffic networks [1, 10] . Furthermore, the numerical results also show that the new bounds are more accurate especially when the degree of asymmetry of the matrix is small.
